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Unconventional approaches to suit unusual circumstances have
become acceptable in monetary policy, a formerly highly conser-
vative discipline. In this paper it is argued that unconventional
approaches should also be considered in sovereign debt manage-
ment, in order to contribute to resolving the eurozone sovereign
debt crisis. First, the Troika crisis lending to indebted sovereign
borrowers in the eurozone is reviewed and compared with stan-
dard IMF post-crisis lending. The main difference and shortcoming
is the unsustainable character of the eurozone approach, due to
the omission of demand stimulation components. To address this
and other shortcomings, the features of an ideal alternative
funding tool are identiﬁed. It would solve the funding problems of
affected sovereigns, help stabilise the banking system, but most of
all stimulate domestic demand and hence end the vicious down-
ward spiral. It is found that this funding method can be imple-
mented as part of enhanced public debt management by each
nation's debt management ofﬁce.
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There is a close link between the European sovereign debt crises and the banking sectors in the
affected countries. Bank bail-outs have contributed to the ﬁscal problems (visibly in Ireland and
Cyprus). Sovereign credit ratings and government bond valuations (and hence public funding costs) are
affected by the state of the banking sector, since the sovereign is seen as the guarantor of the banking
sector. In turn, since banks often own substantial home-country sovereign debt, the perception of
public ﬁnances affects the stability of the banking sector (reﬂected in CDS rates, equity valuations and
banks' credit ratings).
There are also close links between the situation in sovereign bondmarkets, debtmanagement policy
and ﬁscal policy on the one hand and the state of the banking system andmonetary policy on the other:
Basel regulations (since ‘Basel I’ of 1988 attaching a zero risk-weighting to government bonds issued by
OECDmember states, requiring no capital for banks to purchase such bonds; since ‘Basel II’ encouraging
risk measurement methodologies that have resulted in a reduction of the capital cover of large banks),
the increased reliance on credit rating agencies (whose rating behaviour tends to be lagging, enhancing
pro-cyclicality), international accounting standards on marking to market of traded securities
(increasing volatility, contagion and pro-cyclicality; thus government bond price changes immediately
affect banks) and increased securitisation (thus expanding the impact ofmark-to-market rules, since the
latter apply to traded instruments); the design of banking systems as highly leveraged operationswith a
miniscule capital base (usually less than10%of bankassets, so that a reduction in the valueof bankassets,
consistingmainly of bank loans and securities holdings, by less than 10%will render the banking system
insolvent)2; the high degree of inter-bank cooperation needed for continued solvency (guaranteeing
contagion of individual bank problems, rendering the inter-bank market systemically critical); the
widespread reliance of ﬁnance ministries and debt management ofﬁces on technical advice from bond
underwriters, who are interested parties, incentivized to favour the issuance of traded instruments in
public debt management3; and the lack of coordination between different policy-makers.
The aim of this contribution is to consider, in the light of these factors, the sustainability of the
conventional approach to tackling sovereign debt crises in the European case, and to highlight the role
of debt management e speciﬁcally the choice of funding instruments e in the propagation, but also
resolution of the existing problems. On conventional public debt management, see Dornbusch and
Draghi (1990). We consider how ‘unconventional’ or ‘enhanced’ debt management fares, compared
to the conventional approach, with respect to sustainability and achieving desired overall goals.
In the ofﬁcial joint guidelines of the IMF and the World Bank (2003), public debt management is
deﬁned as2 A n
banking
Dyson e
banks h
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debt iss“the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the government's debt in order to
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives… Sovereign debt managers
share ﬁscal and monetary policy advisors' concerns that public sector indebtedness remains on a
sustainable path....” (p. 2).The IMF/World Bank report also highlights the close link of debt management with ﬁnancial
instability and crises:“A government's debt portfolio is usually the largest ﬁnancial portfolio in the country. It often contains
complex and risky ﬁnancial structures, and can generate substantial risk to the government's balance
sheet and to the country'sﬁnancial stability.… Poorly structureddebt in termsofmaturity, currency, or
interest rate composition and large and unfunded contingent liabilities have been important factors in
inducing or propagating economic crises inmany countries throughout history…. By reducing the riskumber of proposals have been put forward to tackle this issue, on occasion also referred to as the ‘fractional reserve
’ model. These include Kotlikoff's (2010) ’narrow banking’ plan, Benes and Kumhof's (2013) ‘Chicago Plan revisited’ and
t al. (2010) with the updated Robertson and Huber (2001) plan. Alternative proposals preserving the special status of
ave also been tabled (Werner, 2010, 2013c).
example of evidence on the role of underwriter incentive structures is Flandreau (2013) considering foreign government
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R.A. Werner / Journal of International Money and Finance 49 (2014) 443e469 445that the government's own portfolio management will become a source of instability for the private
sector, prudent government debt management, along with sound policies for managing contingent
liabilities, can make countries less susceptible to contagion and ﬁnancial risk.”The recommendations and policy responses by international organisations such as the IMF, the
World Bank and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have favoured the increased use
of mark-to-market accounting, VaR-based risk management techniques, policies to broaden and
deepen sovereign bondmarkets, greater securitisation, the use of unregulated derivatives, and reduced
reliance on bank credit.4 Moreover, the ofﬁcial IMF and World Bank (2003) guidelines on public debt
management include the following recommendations:“… debt managers should ensure that their policies and operations are consistent with the devel-
opment of an efﬁcient government securities market … To the extent possible, debt issuance should
usemarket-basedmechanisms, including competitive auctions and syndications… Governments and
central banks should promote the development of resilient secondary markets that can function
effectively under a wide range of market conditions”(p. 8f).The IMF and World Bank guidelines encourage securitised debt strategies.5 No non-securitised
alternative is discussed or has been debated in the literature. This contribution helps to ﬁll this gap.
Furthermore, despite the recognition by the IMFandWorldBankof the close connectionbetween the
actions of the ﬁscal, debt management, monetary and ﬁnancial regulatory authorities, the institutional
design of public policy favoured by them has increased compartmentalisation, resulting in the creation
of independent agencies, at arm's length from the government and each other, but each dealing with
particular aspects of closely related issues: a Treasury/ﬁnance ministry, an independent central bank, a
debt management ofﬁce and often also one (or several) separate ﬁnancial regulator(s) (such as a
Financial Services Authority in the UK). Governments have been advised to de-couple public debt
management fromﬁscal policy considerations, which in turn should be separated frommonetary policy
due to the widespread legal repositioning of central banks as independent principals (another IMF
demand in client countries) (Marcussen, 2005). Debt management is supposed to be ‘delegated’ to a
separate agencyein some countries not staffed by civil servants, but private sector employees.6 The
beneﬁts of explicit coordination have been neglected. The ‘sharing’ of each other's goals was thought to
be enough.7 Each branch of the executive contributes to (but does not necessarily coordinate with
others)monetary,ﬁscal and regulatorypolicy. Since theﬁnancial crisis suchdivisionof competencieshas
been criticised, and in the UK this structure was reformed in April 2013 with the abolition of the FSA.
Enhanced Debt Management is public debt management that considers all funding options to seek
cost-effective solutions, while taking systemic issues and the need for macroeconomic sustainability
and establishing a degree of coordination between ﬁscal, debt management, regulatory and monetary
policy into consideration. It suggests options of how to achieve the common goals of sustainable non-
inﬂationary growth with sustainable government budgets and national debt. It is argued that this
approach offers a viable and attractive solution to the current eurozone sovereign debt crisis./World Bank (2003) says that “developed domestic debt markets can substitute for bank ﬁnancing (and vice versa)
his source dries up, helping economies to weather ﬁnancial shocks” (p. 3), and is backing this with comments by Alan
pan (1999).
ove likely welcomed by the large securities underwriting ﬁrms who often offer lucrative employment to former IMF
rld Bank staff and government ofﬁcials.
he words of IMF/World Bank (2003), needed policies include “a sound institutional structure … including clear dele-
of responsibilities and associated accountabilities among government agencies involved in debt management……there
be a separation of debt management and monetary policy objectives and accountabilities” (p. 5f). In the UK, the Debt
ment Ofﬁce is an executive agency of the Treasury, although “it operates at arm's length from Ministers” (DMO, 2013).
he debt management agencies are operated as limited liability companies with staff who are not civil servants, it may be
or interested parties, such as bond underwriters, to exert undue inﬂuence. Bribing corporate staff has, for instance, been
eductable expense in some countries. Thus it may well be that the new institutional regime created new, different
al conﬂicts of interest and adverse incentive structures.
bt managers, ﬁscal policy advisors, and central bankers should share an understanding of the objectives of debt
ment, ﬁscal, and monetary policies given the interdependencies between their different policy instruments” (IMF/
Bank, 2003, p. 6).
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The dominant conventional approach to sovereign debt crises has been for international organisa-
tions to lend more money to the affected countries, with strings attached, such as the well-known IMF
conditionality (see Dreher, 2009). The eurozone rescue packages have been authorised by the so-called
‘Troika’ of the EU, the ECB and the IMF, together with the governments of the crisis-afﬂicted countries.
When comparing these eurozone packages with the traditional IMF lending e such as applied in the
Asian crisis (1997e1999) emany similarities are found, but also one fundamental difference.
Concerning similarities, both the IMF packages and the Troika programmes have attached particular
conditions to their rescue loans. These have emphasised ﬁscal consolidation, i.e. signiﬁcant cut-backs
in public spending. The aim of improving the budget deﬁcit to GDP and national debt to GDP ratios can
indeed be pursued by tackling the numerator of these ratios. This makes sense under the ceteris paribus
assumption that ﬁscal retrenchment will not reduce GDP e or at least not by more than it reduces the
deﬁcits or national debt. Other similarities of conditionality include the ‘recommendations’ concerning
the sell-off of national assets; the closure/merger/sell-off of particular, named banks to ‘foreign stra-
tegic partners’; the tackling of large-scale bad debts in the banking system or corporate sector by
socialising private sector liabilities and burdening the tax payer; and supply-side policies in the form of
structural reforms towards greater deregulation, liberalisation, privatisation and cut-backs in the role
and inﬂuence of the public sector bureaucracy.
Thus the packages contain many common policies which tend to result in a reduction of domestic de-
mand or an increase in supply, which impart deﬂationary pressures on the economy. However, there is an
important difference: The conventional IMF loan packages have since the 1980s almost always contained a
signiﬁcant pro-growth element. It is this feature that is lacking in the Troika programmes in Europe.
Since the mid-1980s, IMF and World Bank packages have included currency devaluation as part of
the macroeconomic policy mix, offering a boost to exports and thus mitigating the otherwise signif-
icant emphasis on austerity by allowing for at least one avenue of macroeconomic policy to deliver
economic growth.8 The survey of studies by Haque and Kahn (1998) ﬁnds that most IMF programmes
result in an improvement in the current account balance and the overall balance of payments. The IMF
policy-mix has relied on the export sector as the crucial stimulant for growth since the 1980s, in
response to criticism of the perceived prior anti-growth bias of earlier packages. Thus in the 1980s a
‘new orthodoxy’ developed (Sachs, 1987) of lending conditionality consisting of ‘growth-oriented
adjustment programmes’ centred on8 A m
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gramm“‘outward-oriented’ development strategies, designed to produce export-led growth. Increased ex-
ports from the debtor countries are seen as the key to more output, more employment, and more
foreign exchange to service the foreign debts” (p. 1).9Lee and Rhee (2003) evaluate the records of all countries that have experienced a currency crisis and
joined 159 independent IMF conditionality programmes between 1973 and 1994.10 They found that
within two years after the beginning of IMF programmes there is a sharp recovery, wherebyajority of IMF programmes is applied to countries that have ﬂoating exchange rates (or have recently had to abandon
pegged exchange rate regimes, such as in the case of Thailand, Indonesia and Korea right until the Asian crisis). Knight
taella (1997) argue that IMF programme components tend to include measures to increase ﬁscal revenues, reduce
ent expenditures, tighten domestic credit, and adjust the exchange rate. Conway (1994) also ﬁnds that participation in
ckages results in lower public investment, reduced budget deﬁcit or increased surplus, and a real depreciation of the
ge rate.
hs describes this new IMF orthodoxy as consisting of trade liberalisation, currency depreciation and deregulation and
ation of the economy. “This “liberalization package” is urged by the U.S. government as part of the Baker Plan, by many
tial academicians, and by the IMF and World Bank …” (Sachs, 1987, p. 2).
ng data from the IMF Annual Reports, they identify a total gross number of programmes of 455, consisting of 345 stand-
gements, 42 extended fund facility (EFF) arrangements, 44 arrangements under the structural adjustment facility (SAF)
nhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) and 21 combined programmes of two or more such facilities. They reach
number of programmes by subtracting double-counting and prior ongoing programmes before crisis-related pro-
es were commenced.
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the prompt post-crisis recovery” (p. 541).11The modiﬁcation of IMF policies to stimulate growth is not without logic: Economic growth is
important for the sustainability of public debt. Tax revenues and government expenditure on social
welfare tend to be functions of economic growth, and economic growth reduces therefore deﬁcit/GDP
and debt/GDP ratios by reducing the numerator and increasing the denominator simultaneously.
Suitably high economic growth can be argued to be the only way for indebted countries to service and
repay their debts, without the alternatives of high inﬂation, debt forgiveneess/haircuts or default.12
Thus the ultimate success of post-crisis policy packages hinges on their ability to stimulate demand.13
The currency depreciation aspect of IMF packages may constitute a more important aspect than is
commonly recognised in achieving overall success. It is precisely this redeeming, pro-growth feature of
IMF packages that is missing in the Troika packages for the crisis-affected eurozone economies: exit or
devaluation is politically deemed not to be an option. As a result, the restrictive aspects of the con-
ventional approach to the resolution of the European sovereign debt crisis must dominate.
This paper is not concernedwith options that are currentlywithout broad political support, and that
includes an exit from the eurozone (and hence depreciation), default, or the introduction of euro-
bonds.14 Instead, the purpose is to seek an option that avoids default or devaluation, does not rely on
European-level socialised risk or ﬁscal transfers (‘transfer union’), while not suffering from the
drawbacks of the current (conventional) approach. Furthermore, ideally a solution would rely on do-
mestic demand, not export demand, since even foreign growth cannot be relied upon in times of global
instability. Below, the problems of conventional policies are listed and then the features of an ideal
solution are speciﬁed.
Key problems with the conventional policies in the case of the eurozone crisis are:
(a) Conventional responses to banking, sovereign debt or balance of payments crises centre on large
loans from external lenders and thus do not reduce the total debt burden of the affected country
(Werner, 2012b). They increase total debt e the ‘loan shark's solution’ e rendering the total
(though not immediate) interest burden even heavier. Aggregate eurozone public debt increases,
rendering debt problems less, not more sustainable.
(b) Troika conditions focus on ﬁscal retrenchment, while not including an explicit growth policy
(seeMcKee et al., 2012; Stuckler and Basu, 2013; also on the devastating results for public health:
Karger, 2014).
(c) As economic growth contracts or stagnation becomes prolonged, more bank assets become non-
performing (Werner, 1997b, 2013a,b). This could result in a signiﬁcant further increase inwever, the recovery does not take GDP back to its pre-crisis levels, while employment growth remains sluggish
out, leaving unemployment at a higher level “for a long period after the crisis, even if output growth, inﬂation rates, etc.
tored to their pre-crisis level” (p. 541).
the relationship between debt, interest and growth, see Tim Congdon's (1988) classic account.
s is recognised by most investors. For instance, Andreas Utermann, chief investment ofﬁcer of RCM, the equity fund
r owned by Allianz, was quoted on the UK cover page of the Financial Times upon the announcement of the July 2011
escue package: “The trouble with all this is that the crisis will only be on its way to full resolution when it becomes clear
ozone, and in particular the periphery have achieved satisfactory growth rates” (Financial Times, Euro rescue deal fails to
ears, 23 July 2011). See also the CEO of PIMCO, Mohammed El Erian, on the revised Cyprus rescue: “These challenges are
ant, and they will not be overcome easily and immediately. Yet, as large as they are, they pale in comparison to the big
t in the room: the rescue contains very little to enhance Cyprus's ability to grow and create jobs.” (Cyprus: Better
d Rescue, Challenging Implementation, Hufﬁngton Post, 25 March 2013). The literature is not in agreement about the
pact of IMF programmes on growth. This is due to different methodologies and samples. Studies that found signiﬁcant
s in output growth due to the participation in IMF programs include Przeworski and Vreeland (2000), while those with
antly positive output effects include Dicks-Mireaux et al. (2000). Hutchison's (2003) careful methodology yielded a
ant decline in output, but this is followed by a signiﬁcant rebound. Hutchison ﬁnds that domestic credit growth, which is
nly restricted as part of the conditionality, also falls signiﬁcantly under IMF programmes.
obonds are being criticised for further socialising costs across Europe and creating adverse incentive problems, in
n to the absence of a uniﬁed ﬁscal policy or European ﬁnance ministry e the latter of which raise a number of other
R.A. Werner / Journal of International Money and Finance 49 (2014) 443e469448sovereign liabilities, exacerbating the sovereign debt crisis and further undermining banking
systems, as capital ﬂight to core eurozone countries increases (see also the literature on
TARGETII).
(d) Continued stagnation means that ﬁscal deﬁcit/GDP and national debt/GDP ratios remain high
due to a falling denominator, despite radical ﬁscal tightening. As a result, second and third
lending packages to affected countries were negotiated e anecdotal evidence of unsustainable
projections; more rigorous empirical evidence will be examined below.
(e) The Troika rescues are funded largely by core eurozone countries, especially Germany (the
largest net contributor to the EU, Paterson, 1996). Thus a degree of socialisation of risk and the
liabilities of affected countries is taking place, which creates adverse incentives and also in-
creases the indebtedness of the less indebted eurozone members, while increasing total debt (as
noted in point (a) above).
3. The ﬁnancial programming model and the Quantity Theory of Credit
The above problems and causal links render the overall problems larger, not smaller. This can be
demonstrated in a simple macroeconomic model, based on the IMF ﬁnancial programming model e
one of the most widely used macroeconomic policy models in the world and of course the model
applied whenever the IMF engages as lender with a receiver country.15 It can be described as “a simple
ﬂow-of-funds accounting framework of key macroeconomic relationships” (Mussa and Savastano,
2000). The latter authors point out that the policy measures “on which almost all IMF programs
focus are the public sector deﬁcit and the creation of domestic credit…” (as quoted in Easterly, 2002, p
3). Surprisingly, not many economic models used in the academic literature have been explicit about
the role of these variables. In this section this gap is being addressed.
The IMF's ﬁnancial programming starts with the traditional ‘quantity equation’: The basic work
horse is that presented by Friedman (1956), where P is the price level, Y stands for real GDP, V for the
velocity of money (assumed to be stable) and M for the money supply:
PY ¼MV (1)
Equation (1) is a restricted version of Fisher's transactions equation of exchange (2), which says that
the money used to defray transactions is equal to their value:
PQ ¼MV (2)
Thus equation (1) is true if nominal GDP is a good proxy for the value of all transactions. This may
have held true in the 1950s, when Friedman postulated (1). However, it needs to be adjusted to reﬂect
the signiﬁcant changes in the ﬁnancial systems since the 1950s. In particular, it is not true thatmoney is
primarily and exclusively used to fund transactions that contribute to GDP, so that non-GDP trans-
actions (such as all ﬁnancial or asset transactions) can safely be ignored. Many economies experience
asset transaction volumes and asset stock accumulations that in size amount to large multiples of GDP.
In this case, equation (1) will deliver misleading results, including the illusion of a ‘velocity decline’.
Hence amore differentiated equation of exchange is called for, such as proposed byWerner (1992,1997,
2005, 2012a). It is necessary (and possible) to disaggregate the credit aggregate into that credit used to
defray GDP transactions (CR), and that credit used for transactions not contributing to GDP (ﬁnancial
transactions, CF)16:15 Easterly (2002) explains: “One of the most widely used applied models in macroeconomics is the ﬁnancial programming
model of the International Monetary Fund. The IMF emphasizes monetary, balance of payments, and ﬁscal identities in its
design of macroeconomic programs for developing countries with goals for inﬂation and foreign exchange reserve accumu-
lation, and secondarily for calculating debt relief requirements and import requirements for growth” (p. 2f).
16 This is an old idea, mentioned by Fisher (1926), Keynes (1930) and Friedman (1956), but was abandoned, since “dollars of
money are not distinguished according as they are said to be held for one or the other purpose” (p. 61). In other words, such a
disaggregation could not be implemented while money was deﬁned as bank deposits. However, as Werner (1992, 1997) argued,
this is possible when using the credit counterparts deﬁnition of money. Considering growth, we can also write, using ṅ to
denote growth of nominal GDP (PRY) and _cR credit creation for GDP transactions: ṅ ¼ v _cR.
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Deploying this in a disaggregated quantity equation, we obtain for nominal GDP:
CRVR ¼ PRY (4)
Inwords, nominal GDP growth is a stable function of credit creation for transactions that contribute
to GDP. This can also be called a disaggregated ‘credit counterparts’ approach, to use the Bank of
England's terminology.17 Adding recognition of credit creation and credit rationing by banks, this forms
the Quantity Theory of Credit. Empirically, it is well established that bank-created money (credit
creation) can be used for transactions that do not contribute to GDP (Werner, 1992, 1997). In the case of
the UK, the value of such non-GDP transactions (i.e. ﬁnancial or asset transactions) is a multiple in size
of transactions that are part of GDP.
This disaggregated quantity theory of credit also recognises banks as creators of domestic credit and
the broad money supply (see also Ryan-Collins et al., 2012; Bank of England 2014a, b). By dis-
aggregating credit creation into that part which funds (and determines) nominal GDP and that part
which does not contribute directly to GDP (credit for asset and ﬁnancial transactions), Werner (1992,
1997) solved the empirical problem of the apparent velocity decline or breakdown of the money de-
mand function, demonstrating that the true velocity had remained stable and hence reestablishing a
reliable link between the monetary side of the economy and the real economy, as in equation (4). This
says that credit for GDP transactions CR determines nominal GDP (for empirical tests of this rela-
tionship see Werner, 1997, 2005; Lyonnet and Werner, 2012).18
Next consider the government budget deﬁcit, which is the change in national debt, given by the
excess of government expenditure over tax revenues:
DD ¼ G T (5)
whereby taxes T are a fraction of nominal GDP
T ¼ tðPRYÞ (6)
As modelled in the IMF's ﬁnancial programming, the budget deﬁcit can be funded from domestic
credit creation from the central bank or the banks, sales of bonds to domestic investors or sales of
bonds to foreign investors (Mikkelsen, 1998; Easterly, 2002). However, in order to reﬂect the eurozone
institutional design of monetary policy, we must rule out central bank money creation as an autono-
mous option for a national government (governments have delegated direct involvement in themoney
supply to the ECB, the System of European Central Banks and the banking system). Also, to keep the
model parsimonious, assume a closed economy and no bond issuance to foreigners (it is easier to show
an unsustainable ﬁscal situation in the presence of foreign indebtedness). Finally, we do not consider
interest on past debt (the secondary deﬁcit) and instead focus on the primary deﬁcit (as is common in
IMF ﬁnancial programming). This biases the model against us, as it is easier to demonstrate a lack of
ﬁscal sustainability when compounding interest and the secondary deﬁcit from servicing the
outstanding debt are added to the analysis.
The government ﬁnances its government deﬁcit by issuing bonds, purchased by domestic non-bank
investors:
DD ¼ DB (7)17 Deﬁning the money supply by its credit counterpart and disaggregating it into credit creation for GDP transactions, which
determine nominal GDP, and credit creation for non-GDP transactions, which determine asset transaction values (‘Quantity
Theory of Credit’, Werner, 1992, 1997).
18 This replaces the conventional quantity equation ‘PY ¼MV’, which ignores ﬁnancial transactions. They are not part of GDP,
but can be an important destination for the use of money and credit.
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DD=PRY (8’’)
We can substitute equations (4) to (7) into (8) to show how the ﬁscal situation is related to mon-
etary factors:
DD=PRY ¼ DB=PRY ¼ G=VRCR  T=VRCR (8’)
Equation (8’) shows that for any level of government expenditure G and tax revenue T, the deﬁcit to
GDP ratio (i.e. the net bond issuance) rises, as domestic credit expansion CR declines. On the other hand,
for any given level of credit creation CR, an increase in government expenditure G or a fall in tax rev-
enues increases debte as it is not able to boost nominal GDP, which is determined by credit creation CR.
This indicates that it is not entirely misguided to consider cutting expenditure G and raising the tax
rate t in order to reduce the ﬁscal deﬁcit, as the IMF has imposed in its conditionality. Equation (8’),
together with equation (7) also shows that such policies to increase taxes implement a transfer from
tax payers to bond holders, i.e. they constitute regressive tax policy. However, if credit creation is
negative and hence the economy continues to shrink, such policies cannot offer a solution. To the
contrary, shrinking nominal GDP growth results in bankruptcies, rising unemployment and a deteri-
oration in the ﬁscal balance. Bankruptcies, however, also increase bad debts in the banking system,
rendering banks more risk-averse and likely to reduce domestic credit expansion CR further. In other
words, as long as credit creation shrinks, there is no escape from the recessionary spiral e as Japan
demonstrated during the past twenty years (Werner, 2005).
The model, and especially equation (8’), highlights the pivotal role of CR and the risks of engaging in
policies that may have a negative side effect on CR, such as the laudable idea to require banks to in-
crease their capital adequacy (measured for our purposes by the simple capital to asset ratio c/a) e
laudable, but a decade too late (if announced in 2004, it might have helped prevent the unsustainable
credit bubbles in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece that are the cause of their travails). Why the policy
makers did not consider this option in the years before 2007 (given the warnings published in time,
such asWerner, 2003, ch. 18), and why they think the years during or after a banking crisis are the right
time to introduce such measures is puzzling, though not unpredictable (Werner, 2005).
If we now add that the sovereign credit rating (SCR) is a negative function of the deﬁcit-GDP ratio
(among other factors):
SCR ¼ fðDD=PY ;…Þ;with dSCR=dD<0 (9)
and that banks' stock price aggregate (Sb) is negatively affected by a reduction in the SCR, since banks
hold substantial legacy amounts of national government bonds:
Sb ¼ f ðSCR;…Þ;with dSh=dSCR>0 (10)
and that a lower stock price renders equity or debt issuance to shore up bank capital more difﬁcult,
hence tending to increase the cost of bank capital cc
cc ¼ f ðSb;…Þwith dcc=dSb <0 (11)
and if we further postulate that banks' appetite to extend bank credit to the private sector real economy
is a function of the desired capital adequacy ratio (c/a)*; is also inversely related to corporate bank-
ruptcies X, as these increase non-performing loans and hence banks' risk aversion,
CR ¼ f ðcc; c=a*;X;…Þ;
with dCR=dcc<0; dCR=dc=a*<0; dCR=dX <0
(12)
we see how a negative feedback exists that is unsustainable:
CRY/PRYY/DD[/SCRY/SbY/cc[/CRY
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the credit rating agencies downgrade the sovereign credit rating (SCR, equation (9)). The latter results
in lower stock prices (Sb, equation (10)), which render raising capital more expensive for banks (cc,
equation (11)). Banks can achieve a targeted capital adequacy ratio by raising capital or reducing assets.
So for any imposed capital adequacy ratio c/a*, a higher cost of capital cc is likely to encourage banks to
lower bank credits outstanding CR, in order to lower the denominator of the capital-asset ratio c/a
(equation (12)). But lower bank credit creation CR must increase the government deﬁcit (DD, equation
8’), resulting in a further downgrading of the sovereign credit rating, so that the vicious cycle continues.
We also see that the downward spiral is exacerbated by any ill-timed regulatory attempt to increase
banks' desired capital-asset ratios during this process (equation (12)), which is what happened in
recent years in the eurozone under Basel III. The downward spiral would have happened without this,
as we see from the equations above, and as the empirical evidence on Japan has demonstrated; but
raising capital adequacy requirements accelerates the negative feedback, as had beenwarned (Werner,
2005).
The above unsustainable cycle interacts with the other negative feedback loop not explicitly
modelled here, but implicit in equation (4), namely that lower credit creation for GDP transactions, if
falling below the full-employment level of output, will result in unemployment and corporate bank-
ruptcies (X, for exit), which in turn increase banks' non-performing loans (NPL), making them more
risk-averse (RA) and hence likely to reduce credit creation again. Both negative feedback loops are
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Hence themodel indicates that the Troika's policies towards crisis-affected eurozone economies are
unsustainable. Anecdotal empirical evidence seems supportive: the Eurostat ﬁgures for eurozone
national debt in Q1 2013, despite record ﬁscal tightening, showed risen debt, reaching a new record
high of E8.75 trn (92.2% of annual GDP). Some of the biggest rises were recorded by Greece, whose debt
rose to 160.5% of GDP (up from 156.9% at the end of 2012), Portugal, whose debt rose to 127.2% of GDP
(up from 123.8% threemonths earlier and 112% a year before), Ireland, whose debt reached 125% of GDP
(up from 107% of GDP a year earlier), and Italy (reaching 130.3%, up from 123.8% a year earlier; Evans-
Pritchard, 2013a, b).
A sustainable solution without euro exit or default must address the two core issues, namely the
need to generate economic growth (without which the state of government ﬁnances and the banking
sector deteriorate further) and the need to cut through the Gordian knot of the negative feedback
between banking sector stability and sovereign credit rating.
One possibility was proposed by the president of the ECB, Mario Draghi, on 6 September 2012,
namely that the ECB would engage in ‘outright monetary transactions’ (OMT), acting effectively as the
lender of last resort also to governments, in return for acceptance of Troika conditionality and loss of
ﬁscal control to the ESM (Draghi, 2012). However, there are problems with this approach: Firstly, its
legality is in dispute, since it is likely at least to breach the spirit of the no-bailout clause, if not its letter
(Siekmann, 2011, 2012). Secondly, similarly to eurobonds, risk would be socialised at the European
level, creating moral hazard. Thirdly, new macroeconomic costs may be incurred in the eurozone if
outright monetary transactions, due to their expansion of the money supply, result in inﬂation, asset
inﬂation or other transfers. As inﬂation is recognised as a common policy adopted by indebted gov-
ernments to reduce the real debt burden, a further erosion in policy credibility is possible. Fourthly, it is
not clear that this solution will be able to tackle the fundamental problem of lack of growth in the
affected eurozone periphery: there is no empirical evidence that ECB open market purchases are
associatedwith greater economic growth in the affected countries. To the contrary, in the UK case, suchFig. 1. Negative feedback loops after banking crises.
R.A. Werner / Journal of International Money and Finance 49 (2014) 443e469452‘quantitative easing’ has been shown to have a negative coefﬁcient when regressed on nominal GDP
growth (Lyonnet and Werner, 2012a).4. A better option: Enhanced Debt Management
The crisis started in the sovereign bond markets. When the crisis ﬂared up in Greece in late 2009,
yields on outstanding government bonds began to rise, reaching 61% in July 2011 for 5-year govern-
ment bonds, and 35% in January 2012 for 10-year bonds. The pattern was similar in Ireland, Portugal
and Cyprus, with, for instance, Portuguese 5-year government bond yields reaching 18% in December
2011. Even Spanish and Italian bond yields were signiﬁcantly elevated at the height of the crisis, with
Italian ten year benchmark government bond yields approaching 7% in December 2011 and January
2012 and similarly so for Spain in July 2012.
These rising bond yields are problematic, because if newly issued debt requires similarly high
issuance yields, servicing the national debt becomes more burdensome, exacerbating the deﬁcit and
debt problems and sowing further doubts on the sustainability of the debt. The problem is that
speculators may therefore create a situation whereby their collective action of shorting the govern-
ment bonds of a high-debt country, by raising yields, becomes self-fulﬁlling, since this actionmakes the
debt more unsustainable and creates incentives for other investors to sell off their bond holdings,
further raising yields. It is known that a large proportion of investors pursues ‘momentum’ strategies,
act as a herd and thus can create self-fulﬁlling outcomes e a vicious cycle in this case (on momentum
trading and herding behaviour, see Grinblatt et al., 1995; Shiller and Pound, 1989; on herding see
Banerjee, 1992; Brennan, 1990; Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994).
So a core problem is a funding problem ewhich is why the conventional solution has been to offer
external funding from the Troika. The ﬁrst question should thus be whether all funding options have
been considered and exhausted.
The government can fund the public sector borrowing requirement by issuing plain vanilla bonds,
bonds with complex and variable interest, indexed bonds, bonds with restrictive covenants and
optionality, and synthetic constructions of state contingent debt (by managing the maturity structure
of non-contingent debt; see Buera and Nicolini, 2004; Barro, 1997; Bohn, 1988, 1990; Calvo and
Guidotti, 1990). A large number of derivatives may be created to facilitate the construction of an
optimal debt structure and the management of outstanding debt. All of these possibilities have in
common that they refer to securities or otherwise tradable instruments. However, part of the problem,
identiﬁed above, is the very nature of such tradable instruments: they are subject to speculative at-
tacks, and all corporate owners, in line with GAAP or IFRS accounting standards, have to mark their
holdings of such instruments to market. This gives signiﬁcant leverage to speculators: especially when
the ‘free ﬂoat’ of actually traded securities, for instance a particular type of government bond, is small,
and the majority are in the hands of stable, long-term investors (such as pension funds, insurance
companies or, indeed, certain types of banks). Then it is not impossible for speculators to ‘corner’ the
market for traded securities, drive down their prices, force accounting losses on a far larger group of
investors, resulting in further liquidations.19 This accelerates the cascading effect of rising sovereign
bond yields and their joint negative impact on banks in the country and the ﬁscal condition e all of
which in turn creates reasons for bond prices to fall further.
Since the tradability of the debt instruments and the requirement by holders to mark them to
market is an important propagation mechanism for the crisis, which is exacerbated by the effect of
ratings downgrades on debt instruments, a solution would be for governments to issue non-tradable
debt which, according to GAAP, does not have to be marked to market and is not rated by the rating
agencies. This would unravel the Gordian knot of the contagion between the state of banks and public
ﬁnance.
Based on our analysis, it is possible to specify the features of an alternative, ideal funding in the form
of non-traded debt. One can then examine whether it might be possible to design the appropriate19 On market manipulation and the free ﬂoat, see for instance, Allen et al. (2006), J€arvinen and K€appi (2004).
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leading experts in debt origination.
If the non-tradable debt instrument could also raise the borrowed funds at a lower cost than that
required in the bond markets, the proposition would be highly compelling for the ﬁnance ministry or
debt management ofﬁce. Better still if this debt instrument could at the same time solve the problem of
shrinking domestic demand and lack of growth stimulus, by somehow acting to boost domestic de-
mand, solving this core problem of eurozone rescues. But if on top this non-tradable debt instrument
could also be issued entirely domestically, not involving foreign investors, a further propagation
mechanism of the crisis could be eliminated (foreign, especially short-term, liabilities have been rec-
ognised in the literature as being a key factor in triggering sovereign debt and balance of payments
crises; see Rodrik and Velasco, 2000; Gros, 2013). In addition, this would mean that the debt problem
would not be socialised across the eurozone, would not require any ‘transfer union’ features and would
not create adverse incentives, such as moral hazard. It would also mean that the aggregate total debt
would be smaller, since the institutions or countries acting as lenders in the conventional rescue
packages would then not have to get indebted in order to lend these funds. If, ﬁnally, this non-tradable
form of government borrowing would also provide a boon to the domestic banks, offering increased
revenues that they can use to organically build up reserves and larger capital buffers, then the last of
the problem features of the conventional approaches could also be addressed.
But is it possible to design a funding instrument with all these desirable features, namely that it is
(a) non-tradable and would not need to bemarked tomarket by investors, but instead could be kept
on their books at face value;
(b) cheaper, requiring a lower interest rate, than the crisis-period bond market yields;
(c) available without rating from the credit rating agencies and hence also not affected by potential
ratings downgrades;
(d) available domestically, hence not requiring borrowing from abroad, thus resulting in lower total
debt and greater ﬁscal and ﬁnancial stability domestically and in the eurozone;
(e) generating returns for the domestic banking sector, allowing organic growth of reserves and
capital buffers;
(f) boosting domestic demand, delivering overall economic growth, and hence lower deﬁcit/GDP
and debt/GDP ratios by increasing the denominator; such reliance on domestic demand would
be superior to the reliance on external demand of IMF-style packages, as foreign demand is an
exogenous factor.
(g) available without the conditionality of required deep ﬁscal tightening, asset sell-offs and
deﬂationary structural reform?
Given how utopian the wish-list may already appear, one might as well add another, even taller-
sounding feature, which would be the most attractive of all: The ideal alternative funding source
would also
(h) be available on demand by being created ex nihilo domestically, without the need for any capital
by the lenders.
Should such a debt instrument or funding source exist, it would be themost attractive source for the
sovereign borrowers concerned, and not utilising it would be negligent. To ﬁnd it, one could ask the
debt origination experts at a leading international bond investment bankwhether it could be designed.
But securities ﬁrms could hardly expect to earn money on such an instrument. Fortunately, they will
not be needed to design such an instrument: It already exists.
It is one of the oldest and simplest debt ‘products’ in existence: a bank loan contract. In our modern
monetary system, which is dominated by digital money transactions, the total amount of digital money
is controlled by banks and their bank credit creation (Werner, 2005; Ryan-Collins et al., 2012; Bank of
England 2014a, b). For nominal GDP to grow, more (GDP-based) transactions must take place. This
requires a larger amount of money to change hands to pay for this larger amount of transactions. The
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to create more bank credit. In other words, banks need to ﬁnd borrowers willing and able to borrow
from them, so that they can purchase the promissory notes issued by these borrowers. Such promissory
notes can be tradable (corporate bonds for instance) or non-tradable (such as standard loan contracts).
Past approaches to debt management have focused on a narrow set of funding tools and debt
restructuring, including complex derivative instruments. But the simplest, most plain-vanilla of debt
instruments, the bank loan contract, has been unduly neglected, despite superior characteristics.
Enhanced Debt Management suggests that governments of crisis-affected countries should
immediately halt the issuance of new government bonds and also the borrowing from the Troika,
and instead raise the public sector borrowing requirement by entering into loan contracts from the
banks in their country. Since aggregate private debt is much larger than government debt, and
banks are the single biggest providers of the former, they are also able to provide for all the funding
needs of the government. Banks used to be involved in direct lending to governments, but as the
IMF/World Bank manual underlines, this has been actively discouraged for the past twenty years or
so.20
From our model we can immediately see the advantage of bank ﬁnancing of the government deﬁcit,
as this possibility is reﬂected in a more complete equation for government funding. It turns out
equation (7) was a special case of the more general equation (13), whereby additionally it was assumed
that no bank funding was to take place (15):
Hence there are two options to ﬁnance the deﬁcit:
DD ¼ DBþ DCRG (13)
whereby
CR ¼ CRG þ CRP (14)
i.e. bank credit creation forGDPtransactionscanbedisaggregated into suchbankcreditextended to the
public sector (CRG) and to the private sector (CRP). Equation (13) is by no means unusual. Instead, it con-
forms to the standard IMF programming formula of the options to fund the budget deﬁcit, for instance, as
described by IMF (and World Bank) staff Fisher and Easterly (1990) or Mikkelsen (1998). It seems, this
possibility has however been neglected by the members of the Troika, including the IMF itself.
It is now possible to compare the case of bond issuance with the case of bank credit ﬁnance:
Case A (bond ﬁnance):
DCRG ¼ 0 (15)
DD=PRY ¼ DB=PRY ¼ G=VRCR  T=VRCR (8’)
As discussed, this describes an unsustainable situation, whereby reductions in bank credit will
result in rising deﬁcits, which in turn will result in lower credit extension. The situation is different in
the case of bank credit ﬁnance:
Case B (bank ﬁnance):
DB ¼ 0 (16)
so that equation (13) simpliﬁes to
DD ¼ DCRG (17)
And the deﬁcit/GDP ratio becomes:20 Concerning government borrowing from foreign banks, this was fairly common for emerging markets in the past. The Brady
plan of 1989 switched bank lending to emerging market sovereign borrowers into tradable securities.
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Equation (17) now replaces the former equation (7). To simplify further, assume that private ﬁrms
are repaying as many loans as they are taking out, so that real circulating bank credit to the private
sector remains unchanged:
DCRP ¼ 0 (18)
so that
DCR ¼ DCRG (19)
Equation (8’’) then becomes:
DD=PRY ¼ DCR=VRCR (8’’’)
Equation (8’’’) describes the static relationship in a sustainable dynamic process, whereby any given
deﬁcit results in credit creation for GDP transactions, which, according to equation (4) boosts nominal
GDP and according to equation (6) increases tax revenues, thus reducing the deﬁcit, rendering the new
required credit creation in the following period smaller, until the deﬁcit has disappeared. The economy
can of course continue to grow, as (a) the government is free to borrow and thus boost credit creation
even without a deﬁcit, and (b) in reality bank credit to the private sector, DCRP, is likely to expand, as
banking sector health is restored and the economy recovers. Higher nominal GDP means that the
deﬁcit to GDP ratio declines. Thus we know over time, as credit creation rises:
lim
t/∞
DD=PRY ¼ 0 (20)
The deﬁcit to GDP ratio will approach zero, as credit creation for GDP transactions boosts the de-
nominator and increased tax revenues and reduced government expenditure reduce the deﬁcit. In
contrast to the unsustainable (explosive) deﬁcit situation with bond issuance for government funding
in case A, the new policy of not issuing bonds and borrowing from banks is sustainable and delivers the
desired policy outcomes.4.1. Quantity crowding out due to bond issuance
During major recessions and banking crises with corporate bankruptcies, rising bad debts and
large-scale unemployment there may not be much demand for bank loans from the private sector
(while banks may be reluctant to lend to private sector borrowers due to their higher degree of risk
aversion that results from their rising portfolio of non-performing loans). It is thus almost by fortunate
coincidence that the nations affected by the sovereign debt crisis experience a government funding
problem: their governments are keen to borrow money. When this takes the form of bond issuance
that is not bought by banks (case A above), there is no increased credit creation and hence there cannot
be an increase in economic growth. A missed opportunity, and a situation whereby ‘Keynesian’ gov-
ernment spending will not be effective. Considering changes (growth), this can be seen by dividing
nominal GDP growth into private (consumption C þ private investment I þ net exports NX) and public
expenditure (G, equation (23)), substituting in equation (21), the growth version of equation (4), and
solving for private nominal GDP as dependent variable:
DðPRYÞ ¼ VRDCR (21)
DðPRYÞ ¼ DGþ ðDC þ DI þ DNXÞ (22)
ðDC þ DI þ DNXÞ ¼ VRDCR  DG (23)
We expect in an empirical test of case A that the coefﬁcient of DG is negative and signiﬁcant (and in
an ideal world without data inaccuracies approaches1). In other words, to the extent that non-banks
Fig. 2. Traditional bond ﬁnance and crowding out of private demand.
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out private demand. This is indeed what Werner (2012a) reports for Japanese data, robust over
different time periods. To the extent that banks purchase government bonds, this will increase bank
credit creation, but the banks' own stability is affected when the credit rating of the sovereign issuers is
downgraded or bond market speculators sell the government bonds. As discussed above, in this case
the tradability of these credit instruments is problematic. Hence a simple switch from tradable IOUs to
non-tradable IOUs offers tantalising prospects.
Fig. 2 shows the impact of non-monetised ﬁscal policy on the amount of money circulating in the
economy: as the government borrows from the non-bank private sector to fund government expen-
diture, there is no increase in the amount of money circulating in the economy. Since the latter has
been shown to determine nominal GDP growth (Werner, 1997, 2005), such ﬁscal policy cannot address
the problem of weak economic growth. Fig. 2 illustrates the situation when government ﬁscal stim-
ulation is funded by the issuance of bonds that are primarily bought by the non-bank sector. As no new
money creation takes place, the bond issuance must crowd out private activity.
Fig. 3 illustrates the situation when a given government expenditure stimulus is funded by
borrowing from banks via loan contracts. This increases bank credit creation for GDP transactions and
hence the money supply. Nominal GDP is boosted.5. Empirical evidence
The model of nominal GDP growth recognises banks as creators of the money supply, suggesting
causation to run from credit aggregates to other variables.21 Empirical work has found support for
these features of the model. Werner (1997, 2005) on Japan; Lyonnet and Werner (2012) on the UK and21 See also Werner (2005, 2012a,b). Lyonnet and Werner (2012) apply the model to the UK and present empirical evidence
that GDP growth is linked to and unidirectionally Granger-caused by bank credit growth extended for real economy trans-
actions. The Bank of England and the ECB recently endorsed the Quantity Theory of Credit: The former justiﬁed the Funding for
Lending Scheme (FLS) by arguing that a successful quantitative monetary stimulation policy needs to be “designed to incen-
tivise banks and building societies to boost their lending to UK households and private non-ﬁnancial corporations (PNFCs) d
the ‘real economy’” (Churm et al., 2012). This is CR in equation (4), while the precise deﬁnition used by the Bank of England for
FLS (Churm et al., 2012) mirrors that presented in Lyonnet and Werner (2012), which was submitted to the Bank of England in
July 2011, and presented to the ECB in November 2011. On 5 June 2014, the ECB announced “measures to enhance the func-
tioning of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by supporting lending to the real economy” (http://www.ecb.europa.
eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140605_2.en.html), hence also acknowledging the importance of disaggregating credit for real
vs. ﬁnancial transactions (Werner, 1997), which is not backed by any conventional economic models.
loans
(credit creation power)
(no credit creation)
Fig. 3. Enhanced Debt Management and its positive net effect.
R.A. Werner / Journal of International Money and Finance 49 (2014) 443e469 457Castle et al. (2014) on the UK have shown that bank credit creation for GDP transactions is indeed a
statistically superior determinant of nominal GDP growth, encompassing alternative monetary ag-
gregates when the powerful general-to-speciﬁc (GETS) empirical methodology is applied, whereby a
sequential downward reduction from the initial general model to the parsimonious model with valid
restrictions is implemented. The resulting parsimonious model had no statistical problems. Further-
more, co-integration and Granger-causality analysis in these studies suggests unidirectional causation
from bank credit creation to nominal GDP growth. Other empirical evidence in support of the Quantity
Theory of Credit is also cited in Werner (2012a).
Here we test the following four predictions of the model as applied to the eurozone:
Prediction 1: Credit creation for GDP transactions (CR) is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable of
nominal GDP (equation (4) above).
Prediction 2: Private demand is a positive function of credit creation for GDP transactions (CR) and a
negative function of government expenditure (equation (23) above), and, in the pure case, government
expenditure crowds out private demand one to one.
Prediction 3: The market for domestic bank credit, dealing in untraded promissory notes (loan
contracts) is not well integrated with the market for traded government debt (bonds), which should be
reﬂected in a signiﬁcant divergence between the bank lending interest rate for prime customers (prime
rate) and the benchmark sovereign bond yield, especially during crisis periods.
Prediction 4: Equation (8’) is empirically supported, whereby a rise in credit for GDP transactions
(CR) results in a reduction in the deﬁcit/GDP ratio, and for any given level of credit CR, an increase in
government expenditure G or a fall in tax revenues increases the deﬁcit-GDP ratio e as ﬁscal measures
are not able to boost nominal GDP, which is determined by credit creation CR.
We chose Spain as a suitable test case, since detailed data on bank credit, disaggregated by industry
(agriculture, industry, construction, ﬁnance, real estate, various types of service industries) is available
for this important eurozone economy. Furthermore, since the ﬁnancial situation in Spain has not been
as critical as in Ireland, Portugal or Greece, which required IMF involvement, whereas Spain did not, it
is a stricter test of the relevance of our framework. The empirical results are as follows:
Test of Prediction 1 (Credit for GDP transactions is a signiﬁcant explanatory variable of nominal
GDP):
Themodel of nominal GDP as a function of credit for GDP-transactions can be empirically veriﬁedwith
a test that has high power by adopting the general to speciﬁc modelling methodology (GETS, see Hendry
and Mizon, 1978), whereby nominal GDP is regressed against standard variables suggested in macro-
economics, namely interest rates, ameasure of the traditionalmoney supply (in linewith equation (1)), as
well as the variable predicted by theQuantity Theoryof Credit (credit for ‘real’ transactions,CR). If the step-
by-step downward reduction from the general model to the parsimonious form (consisting only of
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our theoretical expectation, this constitutes strong empirical support for our model.
The Bank of Spain's deﬁnition of themoney supply (M1)was used, as well as the 10-year benchmark
government bond yield (Datastream). The GDP series were obtained from the Spanish Instituto
Nacional de Estadistica, whereby nominal, non-seasonally adjusted data were used (all variables in the
model are kept in nominal terms). We could obtain quarterly data from Q11995 to Q3 2013 (the most
recently available data, as of 16 June 2014) for total and disaggregated bank credit (Bank of Spain).
Credit for the ‘real’ economy was deﬁned as total bank credit, but excluding bank credit extended to
other ﬁnancial intermediaries, to the real estate sector and to the construction industry, in linewith the
same deﬁnition of ﬁnancial credit (CF) used by Werner (1992, 1994, 1997, 2005) and Voutsinas and
Werner (2011) when modelling Japanese nominal GDP growth. Like in Japan, in the 2000s the Span-
ish property market had become dominated by speculative ﬁnancial transactions. Calculating the year-
on-year percentage changes (proxied by seasonal log differences), the general model was formulated,
using a lag structure to account for partial adjustment dynamics (4 lags) and tested. The results are
reported in Table 1. The standard summary tests indicate no obvious statistical problems, speciﬁcally
no problems with the normality of the errors.
The model was then sequentially reduced, by imposing linear restrictions, whereby each time only
one variable is dropped (themost insigniﬁcant one) and themodel is re-run, until only variables are left
whose coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant, and/or whose reduction is not permissible according to the linear
restriction tests. Table 2 presents the model after the sequential downward reduction to the parsi-
monious form.
Table 2 shows that interest rates and money supply and their lags drop out in the sequential
downward reduction procedure. The objective ‘GETS’ empirical testing procedure shows that apart
from the lagged dependent variable, only credit creation for ‘real’ transactions is sufﬁcient to accountTable 1
General Model of Spanish Nominal GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1997 (1) to 2013 (3).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
YoYGDP_1 1.02330 0.1492 6.86 0.000 0.5003
YoYGDP_2 0.24206 0.2187 1.11 0.274 0.0254
YoYGDP_3 0.165908 0.2247 0.739 0.464 0.0115
YoYGDP_4 0.0649837 0.1652 0.393 0.696 0.0033
Constant 0.00107905 0.01003 0.108 0.915 0.0002
YoYCr 0.203033 0.06809 2.98 0.005 0.1591
YoYCr_1 0.143448 0.09383 1.53 0.133 0.0474
YoYCr_2 0.117890 0.09021 1.31 0.198 0.0351
YoYCr_3 0.0257736 0.08716 0.296 0.769 0.0019
YoYCr_4 0.00669813 0.06262 0.107 0.915 0.0002
YoYM1 0.00365226 0.01159 0.315 0.754 0.0021
YoYM1_1 0.00461205 0.01390 0.332 0.742 0.0023
YoYM1_2 0.000783806 0.01335 0.0587 0.953 0.0001
YoYM1_3 0.00854402 0.01340 0.638 0.527 0.0086
YoYM1_4 0.00634763 0.01088 0.583 0.562 0.0072
10YRYIELD 0.295657 0.3517 0.841 0.405 0.0148
10YRYIELD_1 0.0383619 0.4339 0.0884 0.930 0.0002
10YRYIELD_2 0.451482 0.4351 1.04 0.305 0.0224
10YRYIELD_3 0.405638 0.4156 0.976 0.334 0.0199
10YRYIELD_4 0.278791 0.3094 0.901 0.372 0.0170
Sigma 0.0102916 RSS 0.00497813315
R^2 0.955787 F(19,47) ¼ 53.47 [0.000]**
log-likelihood 223.429 DW 1.99
no. of observations 67 no. of parameters 20
mean(YoYGDP0) 0.0479131 var(YoYGDP0) 0.00168049
AR 1-5 test: F(5,42) ¼ 0.56734 [0.7245]
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,39) ¼ 1.1179 [0.3620]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) ¼ 3.1473 [0.2073]
hetero test: F(38,8) ¼ 0.38878 [0.9762]
RESET test: F(1,46) ¼ 0.012830 [0.9103]
Table 2
Parsimonious Model of Spanish nominal GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1997 (1) to 2013 (3).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
YoYGDP_1 0.966656 0.05406 17.9 0.000 0.8376
Constant 0.00229636 0.001944 1.18 0.242 0.0220
YoYCr 0.149046 0.05322 2.80 0.007 0.1123
YoYCr_1 0.0741633 0.07422 0.999 0.322 0.0159
YoYCr_2 0.0917735 0.04956 1.85 0.069 0.0524
Sigma 0.00961219 RSS 0.00572843973
R^2 0.949123 F(4,62) ¼ 289.2[0.000]**
log-likelihood 218.726 DW 1.87
no. of observations 67 no. of parameters 5
mean(YoYGDP) 0.0479131 var(YoYGDP) 0.00168049
AR 1-5 test: F(5,57) ¼ 0.41098 [0.8392]
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,54) ¼ 1.5289 [0.2068]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) ¼ 6.9109 [0.0316]*
hetero test: F(8,53) ¼ 0.85089 [0.5630]
hetero-X test: F(14,47) ¼ 0.60100 [0.8504]
RESET test: F(1,61) ¼ 0.85396 [0.3591]
R.A. Werner / Journal of International Money and Finance 49 (2014) 443e469 459for nominal GDP growth. It can be seen that partial adjustment dynamics are at work. The R-square
remains relatively high, and the DurbineWatson statistic shows good results. Checking the usual
summary test statistics, only a potential problem with normality is identiﬁed (at the 5% level). As a
robustness test, we re-ran the equation with a slightly shorter sample, beginning a year later. The
results are presented in Table 3, where coefﬁcients and t-values are very similar, but there is no
problem with error normality or omitted variables.
Test of Prediction 2 (Private demand is a positive function of credit creation and a negative function
of government expenditure):
Using the empirical model estimated for nominal GDP (Table 2), we disaggregate nominal GDP (Y)
into private demand (C þ I þ NX) and government expenditure (G). Testing the postulate that private
demand is a function of credit creation and government expenditure (equation (23) above), we regress
private demand against credit for the ‘real’ economy, as well as government expenditure G. We could
not expect to obtain a coefﬁcient close to 1, if we used log differences or year-on-year growth rates,
hence the model was this time estimated using absolute changes. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that government expenditure and credit for ‘real transactions’ are signiﬁcant
explanatory variables of private demand, accounting for about half of the variation in private demand.
Importantly, the coefﬁcient of government expenditure is 0.9 and thus not far from the theoretically
postulated ideal result of 1.
Test of Prediction 3 (There is a signiﬁcant divergence between the bank lending interest rate for
prime customers, the prime rate, and the benchmark sovereign bond yield, especially during crisis
periods):
We examine the time series data for sovereign bond yields (two different benchmark maturities,
shown in red and green) and the bank lending prime interest rate (prime rate, shown in blue). Figs. 4 to
8 show the benchmark bond yields (5-year and 10-year government bonds) and the prime rate for
bank loans (usually formaturities of 5 years and longer, in blue colour) in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy
and Spain (GIPIS). The data indicate that the interest margin between government bond yields and the
prime borrowing rate has reached several hundred basis points, on occasion even several thousand basis
points. Given these unusually large spreads between the bank credit market for top borrowers and the
bond market for top borrowers, it is concluded that the prediction is corroborated, and eye inspection
is sufﬁcient to verify this result.
Test of Prediction 4 (Equation (8’) is empirically supported, whereby a rise in credit for GDP
transactions (CR) results in a reduction in the deﬁcit/GDP ratio, and for any given level of credit CR, an
increase in government expenditure G or a fall in tax revenues increases the deﬁcit-GDP ratioe as ﬁscal
measures are not able to boost nominal GDP, which is determined by credit CR):
As is readily seen from equation (8’), an empirical application should not use the same data to
describe the deﬁcit that is used to specify the explanatory variables. Since the deﬁcit can be proxied by
Table 3
Parsimonious Model of Spanish nominal GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1998 (1) to 2013 (3).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
YoYGDP_1 0.984538 0.05724 17.2 0.000 0.8361
Constant 0.00230338 0.002043 1.13 0.264 0.0214
YoYCr 0.144682 0.05795 2.50 0.015 0.0970
YoYCr_1 0.0864437 0.07981 1.08 0.283 0.0198
YoYCr_2 0.0845474 0.05408 1.56 0.123 0.0404
Sigma 0.00981712 RSS 0.00558980048
R^2 0.949715 F(4,58) ¼ 273.9 [0.000]**
log-likelihood 204.5 DW 1.87
no. of observations 63 no. of parameters 5
mean(YoYGDP) 0.0469207 var(YoYGDP) 0.00176449
AR 1-4 test: F(4,54) ¼ 0.58566 [0.6744]
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,50) ¼ 1.3475 [0.2655]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) ¼ 5.8139 [0.0546]
hetero test: F(8,49) ¼ 0.77524 [0.6262]
hetero-X test: F(14,43) ¼ 0.61475 [0.8378]
RESET test: F(1,57) ¼ 0.50023 [0.4823]
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deﬁnition for the dependent variable, and deploy the national income accounts in order to obtain time
series for government expenditure and tax revenues. Credit for GDP transactions CR is modelled using
the same variable as above. Next, we formulate the general model of equation (8’), allowing for partial
adjustment dynamics by the application of a lag structure (4 lags). The deﬁcit/GDP ratio is then
regressed against its own lags, a constant, and the ratios of government expenditure G to CR and tax
revenues T to CR and their respective lags. The model was sequentially reduced to the parsimonious
form. The speciﬁc model is reported in Table 5.
The table shows that over 88% of the variation in the deﬁcit to GDP ratio is accounted for, without
serial correlation problems. Both theoretical explanatory variables (G/CR and T/CR) are highly signiﬁcant
(with lag structure) and, most importantly, the signs are as expected: positive for government
expenditure/credit and negative for tax revenues/credit. The summary test statistics however show a
problemwith autoregressive errors. In order to check for robustness and error normality, equation (8’)
was recast in logarithms as follows:
lnðDD=PRYÞ ¼ aþ b lnðG TÞ  g ln CR (24)
The empirical test results are reported in Table 6.
Table6 indicates that thedeﬁcit isnot signiﬁcant as explanatoryvariableof thedeﬁcit-GDP ratio, since
it is to a large extent explained bycredit for GDP transactions (CR).Meanwhile, the standard tests showed
noproblemswith the speciﬁcation. This is a stronger result thanexpected, and it promptedus to examine
the adjustment dynamics a bit closer, by formulating a general model with four lags and reducing down
to the parsimonious model. The ﬁnal result of the downward reduction is presented in Table 7.
We now ﬁnd that over 67% of the variations in the deﬁcit/GDP ratio are explained by the lagged
dependent variable and credit for GDP transactions (CR), without any error normality problems orTable 4
Model of Spanish Private-Sector GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1997 (1) to 2013 (3).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
Constant 4217.34 830.0 5.08 0.000 0.2874
DG ¡0.924730 0.4175 2.21 0.030 0.0712
DCR 0.000228509 3.287e-005 6.95 0.000 0.4302
Sigma 5252.43 RSS 1.7656301eþ009
R^2 0.499559 F(2,64) ¼ 31.94 [0.000]**
log-likelihood 667.486 DW 0.208
no. of observations 67 no. of parameters 3
Mean (DPrivateGDP) 6401 var(DPrivateGDP) 5.2659eþ007
Fig. 4. Greece: Bank funding costs (blue) vs. bond funding costs (green, red). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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icant. It must be concluded that the empirical evidence suggests that a key factor in determining
deﬁcit-GDP ratios in particular and sovereign debt problems in general is the quantity of credit for GDP
transactions (CR), which has been unduly neglected in Troika policy deliberations and packages.
We conclude that the empirical evidence supports the predictions made based on our model.
Predictions 1 to 4 all lend empirical support to the view that the traditional eurozone approach to the
sovereign debt crisis has been unsustainable, and that the key explanatory variable, credit creation for
GDP transactions, has remained neglected by the Troika. While credit creation shrank, the attempts to
solve the crisis could not succeed. Enhanced Debt Management, by switching funding of the public
sector borrowing requirement from bond issuance to borrowing from domestic banks, is a promising
policy that is likely to end the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.6. Extensions of Enhanced Debt Management
Enhanced Debt Management is not a panacea. It helps sovereigns in various ways, including by
stimulating growth, and it helps banks, by providing an opportunity for signiﬁcant organic growth andFig. 5. Ireland: Bank funding costs (blue) vs. bond funding costs (green, red). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 6. Portugal: Bank funding costs (blue) vs. bond funding costs (green, red). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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depreciating government bonds that must be marked to market. However, it does not directly address
the problem of large and rising non-performing loans in the banking system. So Enhanced Debt
Management does not deal with the issue of unsound banking systems that require signiﬁcant
recapitalisations within a very short period of timee of an extent so large that organic revenue growth
offered by Enhanced Debt Management is insufﬁcient.
For this contingency, a second, related though separate measure can be adopted. Banking crises are
the result of non-performing assets in the banking system. As mentioned, since banks have less than
10% of capital to back their loan and securities books, only a decline of less than 10% in the valuation of
their assets will render them bankrupt. This is another reason why it is important for banks to ensure
that a large proportion of their assets are loan contracts that are not tradable, and hence do not have to
be marked to market. It is why securitisation of loans tends to increase instability in the ﬁnancial
system: securitised loans need to be marked to market, are subject to the inﬂuence of credit rating
agencies and can be targets for speculative attacks.Fig. 7. Italy: Bank funding costs (blue) vs. bond funding costs (green, red). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 8. Spain: Bank funding costs (blue) vs. bond funding costs (green, red). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this
ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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portfolio falls by enough to amount to a drop in total asset values of 10%) and banks are insolvent, an
emergency measure is needed. What features would an ideal policy response to such a banking crisis
have? The following list can be identiﬁed:
(a) It would eliminate the non-performing assets from the banks' balance sheets.
(b) The banks would obtain the original face value of the non-performing assets in cash, thus
rendering their balance sheets solid and highly liquid. There would no longer be a banking crisis
or instability in the banking system.
(c) It would achieve this at zero new costs for the tax payer.
(d) There would not be any further repercussions, national debt or interest payments as a result of
this removal of the non-performing assets from the banks' balance sheets.
(e) The method should not increase the amount of money in circulation in the economy, as this
could potentially result in inﬂationary pressures and an inﬂation cost to tax payers and the
economy.Table 5
Modelling Deﬁcit/GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1997 (1) to 2013 (3).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
Deﬁcit/GDP_1 0.501375 0.09665 5.19 0.000 0.3169
Deﬁcit/GDP_3 0.243561 0.1130 2.16 0.035 0.0742
Deﬁcit/GDP_4 0.425029 0.09895 4.30 0.000 0.2413
Constant 0.0454516 0.05744 0.791 0.432 0.0107
G/CR0_2 2.16915 0.5539 3.92 0.000 0.2091
G/CR0_3 2.61507 0.5427 4.82 0.000 0.2859
T/CR0_1 3.17989 0.9363 3.40 0.001 0.1659
T/CR0_2 3.64912 1.052 3.47 0.001 0.1719
T/CR0_3 1.85276 0.7384 2.51 0.015 0.0979
Sigma 0.0532019 RSS 0.164165612
R^2 0.887268 F(8,58) ¼ 57.06 [0.000]**
log-likelihood 106.319 DW 1.72
no. of observations 67 no. of parameters 9
mean(Deﬁcit/GDP) 0.146199 var(Deﬁcit/GDP) 0.021735
AR 1-5 test: F(5,53) ¼ 4.4560 [0.0018]**
ARCH 1-4 test: F(4,50) ¼ 0.99865 [0.4171]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) ¼ 0.29119 [0.8645]
hetero test: F(16,41) ¼ 1.2282 [0.2889]
RESET test: F(1,57) ¼ 1.1963 [0.2787]
Table 6
Modelling LDeﬁcit/GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1996 (1) to 2004 (4).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
Constant 33.2629 5.654 5.88 0.000 0.5119
LG-T 0.0171783 0.3576 0.0480 0.962 0.0001
LCr 2.96886 0.4922 6.03 0.000 0.5244
Sigma 0.718826 RSS 17.0514568
R^2 0.560695 F(2,33) ¼ 21.06 [0.000]**
log-likelihood 37.6307 DW 1.6
no. of observations 36 no. of parameters 3
mean(LDeﬁcit/GDP) 2.65345 var(LDeﬁcit/GDP) 1.07818
AR 1-3 test: F(3,30) ¼ 1.4699 [0.2426]
ARCH 1-3 test: F(3,27) ¼ 1.4168 [0.2595]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) ¼ 1.8950 [0.3877]
hetero test: F(4,28) ¼ 1.6386 [0.1924]
hetero-X test: F(5,27) ¼ 1.3372 [0.2788]
RESET test: F(1,32) ¼ 0.71438 [0.4043]
Table 7
Modelling LDeﬁcit/GDP by OLS. The estimation sample is: 1997 (1) to 2004 (4).
Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-value t-prob Part.R^2
LDeﬁcit/GDP_2 0.411587 0.1731 2.38 0.025 0.1731
LDeﬁcit/GDP_3 0.458077 0.1909 2.40 0.024 0.1757
LDeﬁcit/GDP_4 0.696792 0.2009 3.47 0.002 0.3083
Constant 58.4438 11.65 5.02 0.000 0.4825
LCr0_2 5.17792 1.011 5.12 0.000 0.4928
Sigma 0.635421 RSS 10.9015187
R^2 0.672909 F(4,27) ¼ 13.89 [0.000]**
log-likelihood 28.1767 DW 1.91
no. of observations 32 no. of parameters 5
mean(LDeﬁcit/GDP) 2.78703 var(LDeﬁcit/GDP) 1.04152
AR 1-3 test: F(3,24) ¼ 0.38313 [0.7661]
ARCH 1-3 test: F(3,21) ¼ 0.041499 [0.9884]
Normality test: Chi^2(2) ¼ 4.6562 [0.0975]
hetero test: F(8,18) ¼ 0.44824 [0.8760]
hetero-X test: F(14,12) ¼ 0.65919 [0.7735]
RESET test: F(1,26) ¼ 0.053692 [0.8186]
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rules concerning the extension of credit, in order to avoid future banking crises.22
Again, we ﬁnd that this ideal policy measure already exists e and it has in the past been used
successfully for this purpose: instead of the government using tax money to bail out banks, the central
bank can purchase the non-performing assets from banks (if needed, via a subsidiary) at face value. The
equity (e.g. in the untraded subsidiary) does not have to be marked to market by the central bank.
There is no cost to the tax payer. This method has been used by the Bank of England in 1914, the Bank of
Japan in 1945 and the Federal Reserve in 2008. It is puzzling, why the Bank of England did not use this
method in 2007e2009, why the ECB has so far not employed it, and why the Irish central bank was not
asked to undertake this taske and instead decision-makers chose to use tax money, therebymassively
increasing debt and future compound interest liabilities emaking the job of debt management all the
harder, effectively bankrupting Ireland and causing the IMF/Troika to be called in.
Could the answer be that a fear of inﬂation has cautioned central banks against this measure? Central
bankshave, aspartof theirQEprogrammes,purchasedsigniﬁcantamountsof securities andprivate sector22 These rules would require banks not to extend credit for transactions that do not contribute to GDP (and hence are capital-
gains oriented asset transactions that tend to fuel asset boomebust cycles and cause instability in the ﬁnancial system).
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tionarypressure (includingasset inﬂation, seeBernardoet al., 2013).However, concerning thepurchaseof
non-performing assets by the central bank frombanks, such a fear is unfounded: Thismethod constitutes
an accounting transaction within the banking system (consisting of the banks and the central bank),
without the injection of new funds from the banking system into the non-banking sector of the economy.
This would explain why the trebling of the Fed balance sheet in late 2008, due to purchasing non-
performing assets, did not result in a signiﬁcant weakening of the US dollar or inﬂation: no money was
injected into markets due to this banking sector accounting mop-up operation. It did, however, have the
desired result of strengtheningbanks' balance sheets enough toproducemore than5%bankcredit growth
in 2012 and a signiﬁcant recoveryewhile in the UK,where the Bank of England did not undertake such a
policy, bank credit contracted by more than 2% and the economy experienced a double-dip. Such
‘EnhancedBankRescues’by the centralbank, asopposed to the taxpayer, alsoproduceda swift recovery in
bank credit growth in theUK in1914 and in Japan in 1946, delivering signiﬁcant nominal GDPgrowth. The
US is currently enjoying similar fruits of thismethod: the economy has recovered, thanks to a recovery in
bank credit creation. The ECB's latest proposal to purchase asset-backed securities seems to reﬂect this
proposal, presented to the ECB in November 2011. To minimise transfers across borders, however, these
purchases should be undertaken by the respective national central banks, and not without conditions.7. Conclusions
The analysis indicates that Enhanced Debt Management (EDM) yields a number of signiﬁcant ad-
vantages over traditional bond ﬁnance:
1. Bank loan contracts are not tradable and do not have to bemarked tomarket. Speculative attacks
on the debt are impossible.
2. During the crisis, untraded bank loan funding has remained signiﬁcantly cheaper than traded
bond ﬁnance for governments. It is surprising that debt management ofﬁces have not switched
from bond issuance to borrowing from banks via loan contracts. Italy in 2012 could have saved
billions of euros thanks to lower interest charges.23
3. With EDM, sovereign credit ratings are not needed (saving costs) and rating downgradeswould be
irrelevant, not affecting banks' balance sheets or the government's ability to borrow from banks.
4. Bank loans are available domestically and hence deliver a more stable debt structure, inde-
pendent from borrowing from abroad.
5. When banks need to generate returns as reserves or capital buffers, a sustainable method is to
allow them to earn these through growth, by lending to the government.
6. Bank credit creation for transactions that are part of GDP has been identiﬁed as the main
determinant of nominal GDP growth.24 Hence an increase in bank credit is required to boost23 An estimate can be readily made using the 2012 bond issuance of E 260bn, the 10-year benchmark yield at the beginning of
2012 and the prime borrowing rate for maturities of 5 years or later.
24 Also according to the ECB, the weak bank credit data is the main reason for the uninspiring growth outlook in the eurozone.
In his press statement of 6 September 2012, President Draghi ﬁrst explained the downward revision of growth forecasts by
Eurosystemmacroeconomics staff, followed by the ECB's monetary analysis: “Turning to themonetary analysis, the underlying
pace of monetary expansion remained subdued. The annual growth rate of M3 increased to 3.8% in July 2012, up from 3.2% in
June. The rise in M3 growth was mainly attributable to a higher preference for liquidity, as reﬂected in the further increase in
the annual growth rate of the narrow monetary aggregate M1 to 4.5% in July, from 3.5% in June. The annual growth rate of loans
to the private sector (adjusted for loan sales and securitisation) remained weak at 0.5% in July (after 0.3% in June). Annual
growth in MFI loans to both non-ﬁnancial corporations and households remained subdued, at 0.2% and 1.1% respectively (both
adjusted for loan sales and securitisation).… Looking ahead, it is essential for banks to continue to strengthen their resilience
where this is needed. The soundness of banks' balance sheets will be a key factor in facilitating both an appropriate provision of
credit to the economy and the normalisation of all funding channels“ (op. cit.). Both the downward revision of the growth
forecast and the assessment that “the underlying pace of monetary expansion remained subdued” could not have been based
on the traditional monetary aggregates, since these showed an acceleration, not slow-down. Instead, they seem to be based on
the bank credit aggregates and the outlook for the state of health of the banking system. This, as well as recent attempts to boost
‘credit for the real economy’, suggests that the ECB has accepted Werner's (1992, 1997, 2011, 2012) Quantity Theory of Credit.
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This boosts nominal GDP growth and hence domestic demand, resulting in greater employment,
lower expenditure on unemployment beneﬁts, greater tax revenues and hence lower deﬁcits
and also larger GDP, lowering the deﬁcit/GDP and debt/GDP ratios by lowering the numerator
and increasing the denominator.
7. The bank loans are available from domestic banks without the need to request government
assistance from the Troika, and thus avoid the intrusive conditionality, including deﬂationary
structural supply-side reforms or cuts in welfare or education budgets.
8. The banks could create the required funds out of nothing by crediting the government's accounts
with them (as is usual banking practice; see Werner, 2005; Ryan-Collins et al., 2012). No capital
is required for such bank lending to the sovereign according to the Basel rules.
9. The government would save the bond issuance fee, which may be small in percentages (0.4% in
times of stability, but up to 2% during crises and for emerging markets; Nieto-Parra, 2009), but
can be substantial in absolute amounts.
10. Finally, banks are able to utilise these non-tradable loans as sovereign collateral with the ECB to
reﬁnance themselves (ECB, 2011a, b).
We conclude that Enhanced Debt Management is an attractive option to end the eurozone sover-
eign debt crisis. While such debt, in the form of bank loan contracts, is highly traditional, the insti-
tutional and debt management policy changes of the past twenty years or so have rendered it
‘unconventional’ today.
Is Enhanced Debt Management proposing a ‘free lunch’? Sadly, there is no such thing. The banking
crises, sovereign debt crises, recessions and high unemployment in the eurozone periphery countries
are vivid reminders that this crisis has been highly costly and indeedmust rank, in terms of the costs of
the resource misallocation, among the most expensive economic dislocations in peacetime history.
Instead, Enhanced Debt Management can only offer a method to end the ongoing and highly costly
destruction of economic value and deadweight loss of potential output (not to mention human cost) due
to underutilisation of resources (such as large-scale unemployment), and doing so in a way that is
cheaper than alternative (and ﬂawed) methods pursued by the Troika.
The proposed measure is similar to the long-term reﬁnancing operation (LTRO) announced by the
ECB on 8 December 2011. This allowed banks to switch from securitised, traded funding instruments to
OTC (over-the-counter) funding via direct loans from the ECB. Over E1trn in such 3-year loans at very
favourable conditions were granted by the ECB as part of this programme. With this measure the ECB
took the step of allowing banks to swap tradable securities for non-tradable loan contracts e with the
ECB as counterparty. The Enhanced DebtManagement proposal was presented to over 30 senior staff of
the ECB in the ECB Council Room on 28 November 2011 (Werner, 2011). The subsequently announced
LTRO reﬂects the recognition by the ECB that tradable securities are not always the most attractive or
suitable form of funding and instead non-tradable debt in the form of direct loan contracts must be
considered. Although the LTRO has ensured high bank liquidity, the funds have largely accumulated as
unused excess reserves of the banks held at the ECB, and have not contributed to credit creation and
hence monetary and GDP growth. The proposed measure would change this and constitutes a needed
counterpart to the LTRO.
According to the IMF/World Bank (2003) manual on public debt management,“The main objective of public debt management is to ensure that the government's ﬁnancing needs
and its payment obligations are met at the lowest possible cost over the medium to long run,
consistent with a prudent degree of risk” (p. 9).Given this main objective, it is difﬁcult to see how the ﬁnance ministries and debt management
ofﬁces, as well as the Troika have overlooked the fact that far cheaper public debt ﬁnancing has
been available for many of the crisis-affected countries than in the securitised bond markets. This
cheaper funding (EDM) via bank credit would trigger an economic recovery, boosting tax revenues.
The negative spiral would quickly be turned into a positive one. The humble switch in the funding
technique of the public sector borrowing requirement e a debt management policy e turns out to
R.A. Werner / Journal of International Money and Finance 49 (2014) 443e469 467be a powerful tool to solve a major international ﬁnancial conundrum, by offering a stable pro-
growth stimulation policy that however does not cost any extra money. Enhanced Debt Manage-
ment would unite debt management, ﬁscal and monetary policies in order to achieve the goal of a
sustainable recovery.
There is also an historical precedent for this type of policy: the economics is the same as that of the
system of short-term bills of trade issued by semi-public entities in the years from 1933 onwards in
Germany, which were bought by the German banks, hence increasing bank credit creation. These are
known as ‘MefoWechsel’, after one of the issuers, the Metallurgical Research Corporation. This method
was introduced by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, the German central bank, in 1933
(Werner, 2003). Themethod, which was called ‘silent funding’, was highly successful. It was introduced
by the UK Treasury duringWWII in the form of non-negotiable Treasury Deposit Receipts issued only to
English and Scottish banks. In the 1930s the bills of trade were a preferable method (instead of direct
loan contracts with banks), since banks did not have to mark securities to market, and credit rating
agencies did not exist. The method suggested here, of direct loans by banks to governments, is a
modern version more suitable to today's regulatory and ﬁnancial market environment.25 The effect of
stimulating a recovery would be the same.
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